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GOVERNMENT RECOVERY OF EMERGENCY SERVICE
EXPENDITURES: AN ANALYSIS OF
USER CHARGES
I. INTRODUCTION
Eighteen million automobile accidents occurred in the United States
in 1981.1 There were more than five thousand railroad accidents,' more
than three thousand aviation accidents3 and more than five thousand
deaths by drowning.4
Thousands of emergencies occur in the United States every day. To
abate emergencies, the government has formed emergency service organi-
zations. Most common among these are fire and police departments.
Private businesses also respond to the need for emergency services.
Among the private services now offered are tow trucks and ambulances.
Private and public emergency service organizations differ primarily
in their methods of collecting revenue.' A tow truck operator ordinarily
charges an automobile owner or user for the tow. Similarly, a hospital
operating an ambulance service will bill a patient for the price of emer-
gency transportation. Public emergency services, however, are almost
universally funded by tax revenues. A homeowner who calls the police
in the middle of the night after hearing strange sounds in the backyard
does not receive a bill for police investigation. Nor does a stranded hiker
pay for rescue efforts.
1. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, 1982-83 STATISTICAL AB-
STRACT OF THE UNrED STATES 608 (Chart No. 1047) (103d ed. 1982).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id. at 76 (Chart. No. 113).
5. There are a number of differences between the types of services that are publicly and
privately funded. For example, only the federal government provides military protection.
Conversely, only private organizations provide pool cleaning services. The reasons for public,
rather than private, provision of services are numerous. In some areas, such as law enforce-
ment, the decision to keep control of the service in the hands of the public is basically political.
There is a fear that private organizations would abuse the power of the law. In other areas, the
private sector might not provide a service, even if permitted, due to the presence of unfavorable
economic factors such as large fixed expenditures.
This Comment does not address the question of which needs should be met by public or
private organizations. Rather, the focus is on the funding of the service which society has
decided to pay for from the public coffers. For a discussion of the reasons for public provision
of services, see generally J. DUE & A. FRIEDLAENDER, GOVERNMENT FINANCE: ECONOMICS
OF THE PUBLIC SECTOR (7th ed. 1981); R. HAVEMAN & J. MARGOLIS, PUBLIC EXPENDI-
TURES AND POLICY ANALYSIS (1970); C. SHOUP, PUBLIC FINANCE (1969).
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There is no legal requirement that taxpayers fund emergency serv-
ices. For example, although the services of fire departments traditionally
are provided free of charge, some states have enacted statutes imposing
liability for firefighting costs on those who tortiously cause a fire.6 Simi-
larly, the costs of abating hazardous nuisances are sometimes assessed
against the individual responsible for the threat to life or property.7 In
general, however, there is a long-standing tradition of public funding of
emergency services.
This Comment presents an argument for direct charges against
those who negligently cause the need for emergency services. These
charges will be referred to as "user charges."' The primary rationale
supporting the imposition of user charges is a practical one-deterrence.
Charging tortfeasors for the cost of emergency services may reduce the
frequency and severity of tortious behavior. A reduction in the number
of emergencies will permit a reduction in service needs. Thus, the costs
6. Annot., 90 A.L.R.2d 873 (1963). Statutes imposing liability on those causing fires are
recognized as valid exercises of a state's police power. Id. at 875.
7. See infra text accompanying notes 47-53.
8. A "user charge" is the dollar amount per unit of a good or service which is collected
from the recipient of the good or service. R. BIRD, CHARGING FOR PUBLIC SERVICES: A
NEW LOOK AT AN OLD IDEA 3 (1976). User charges are a form of benefit taxation, imposed
on those who benefit from a publicly provided good or service, such as stamps for postal
services or bills for publicly provided water. See generally id. at 1-22.
The California fire liability law provides an example of how the amount of a user charge
can be calculated. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 13009 (West 1984) provides in pertinent
part:
(a) Any person who negligently ... sets a fire, allows a fire to be set, or allows a fire
kindled ... to escape onto... property is liable for the fire suppression costs incurred
in fighting the fire and for the cost of providing rescue or emergency medical services.
In People v. Southern Cal. Edison, 56 Cal. App. 3d 593, 128 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1976), the
court held that the measure of expense under § 13009 requires that "(1) the expense claimed be
incurred in fighting the fire, (2) that said expense be the proximate result of defendant's wrong-
ful conduct, and (3) that said expense be reasonably incurred." Id. at 605, 128 Cal. Rptr. at
705. Under this formulation, the court approved the state's fire cost report which set expenses
at $21,548.19. Id. The fire cost report was "a compilation of activity cards which were main-
tained by members of the fire crew on various vehicles and subpurchase orders used to pay for
various services or materials and other documents listing goods or services used in fighting the
fire." Id.
In 1984, the California Legislature enacted CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 13009.1(a)
(West Supp. 1985), which adds the following to recoverable expenses:
(1) The cost of investigating and making any reports with respect to the fire.
(2) The costs relating to accounting for that fire and the collection of any funds
pursuant to Section 13009, including, but not limited to, the administrative costs of
operating a fire suppression cost recovery program. The liability imposed ... is
limited to the actual amount expended which is attributable to the fire, but not to
exceed 10 percent of the amount recoverable pursuant to Section 13009.
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 13009.1(b) (West Supp. 1985) subjects an award under
§ 13009.1(a) to the discretion of the court.
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of accidents will fall if user charges are imposed directly on those people
causing the emergencies. This "deterrent" effect achieved by the imposi-
tion of user charges does not result from the traditional system where tax
revenues fund the emergency service.
Although the following analysis may serve as a foundation for legis-
lation, it is primarily addressed to lawyers representing public entities. A
public entity seeking to recover the cost of an excessive emergency ser-
vice expenditure will rarely find legislation authorizing such a recovery.
Consequently, any suit to recover these costs must be based on common
law. The little precedent available indicates a hostile judicial attitude
towards government recovery in such situations. However, precedent in-
dicates that if the suit employs either a nuisance or quasi-contractual
theory of recovery, the courts may be less resistant to awarding damages.
This Comment is organized into two sections. The first section ex-
amines three cases9 where a government entity sought to recover ex-
penses incurred in providing emergency services without statutory
authority for the recovery. The first section also analyzes nuisance law to
9. Only three cases used common law principles to permit government recovery of user
charges. City of Flagstaff v. Atchinson, T. & S.F. Ry., 719 F.2d 322 (9th Cir. 1983) (denying
government recovery of user charges for evacuation costs after derailment of cars carrying
liquified petroleum gas); Brandon Township v. Jerome Builders, Inc., 80 Mich. App. 180, 263
N.W.2d 326 (1977) (allowing imposition of user charges for Township repair of defendant's
own dam); City of Bridgeton v. B. P. Oil, Inc., 146 N.J. Super. 169, 369 A.2d 49 (1976)
(denying government recovery for cleanup of defendant's property after oil spill). As acknowl-
edged in one of these cases, "precedent on the point is limited." Flagstaff, 719 F.2d at 323
(citing City of Bridgeton v. B. P. Oil, Inc., 146 N.J. Super. 169, 369 A.2d 49 (1976), where the
court cited the Declaration of Independence as its only authority).
One other case addressed the possibility of a common law action for recovery of emer-
gency service expenses. After finding that a Virginia statute permitted the United States to
recover costs it incurred to save the George Washington National Forest from a forest fire set
by the defendant, the court in United States v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry., 130 F.2d 308 (4th Cir.
1942), stated:
Aside from the question of recovery under the statute we are of the opinion that the
plaintiff was entitled to relief in tort.
"A person whose legally protected interests have been endangered by the tor-
tious conduct of another is entitled to recover for expenditures reasonably made or
harm suffered in a reasonable effort to avert the harm threatened."
Id. at 310 (quoting RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 919 (1939) (adopted in substantially the same
form in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 919 (1979))) (other citations omitted). Chesa-
peake is the only decision to cite § 919 of the second Restatement for the proposition that the
government may collect expenses in tort for efforts to save government property. See RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS app. § 919 (1982). The cases citing § 919 involve recovery
by private individuals for expenses incurred to avert harm. Id. The court in Chesapeake found
the government to possess a legally protected interest in its own realproperty. 130 F.2d at 309-
10 (emphasis added). Whether the court would find the government similarly possesses a
legally protected interest in the lives, safety and property of its citizens is not clear. Since the
court's treatment of the tort action was cursory, Chesapeake was not included in the text of
this Comment.
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illustrate that a "single event" may generate a cause of action under a
nuisance theory."0 The second section discusses the deterrent impact of
user charges if they were applied against negligent conduct.
II. THE JUDICIAL LEGAL CONTEXT
As mentioned in the introduction, a lawyer representing the govern-
ment will rarely find statutory authorization for the imposition of user
charges. Nor is there much judicial precedent available. 1
A. The Case Law
1. City of Bridgeton v. B. P. Oil, Inc.
In City of Bridgeton v. B. P. Oil, Inc., 2 the defendants were the
owner and lessee of real estate in the City of Bridgeton, New Jersey.
Leaks in a gasoline tank located on the property prompted the City to
take precautionary measures to prevent the spread of the resulting oil
spill. The City's fire department was present at the site for a week.
Equipment and chemicals were specially purchased to abate the damage.
In addition, extensive overtime pay was required to keep emergency per-
sonnel on the job."1
The City filed suit against B. P. Oil, Inc., asserting that "when one's
actions cause excessive use of its fire department, that person should pay
for its services." 4 In essence, the City attempted to impose a user charge
on the defendants. The City restricted user charges to "excessive"
users15 and to situations where tortious conduct caused the need for the
service. 16 The court held that the City was not entitled to recover the
10. See infra text accompanying notes 70-83.
11. See supra note 9.
12. 146 N.J. Super. 169, 369 A.2d 49 (1976).
13. Id. at 171, 369 A.2d at 50.
14. Id. at 178, 369 A.2d at 54 (emphasis added). Apparently, the City created the exces-
sive use theory on its own. No case law was cited for the common law proposition. Id.
15. Excessive use might be required before a court would feel comfortable imposing a user
charge, as it can easily be argued that the defendant's previous tax payments must surely have
entitled the defendant to "some" use. However, if a city's fire department is present on the
defendant's land for one week cleaning up an oil spill with new chemicals and equipment it
acquired specially for that purpose, this argument would clearly seem weaker. Note, however,
that the defendants in Bridgeton argued this point successfully. 146 N.J. Super. 179-80, 369
A.2d at 54-55.
16. The amount of use is not in question unless the underlying behavior was tortious.
Although not stated in the Bridgeton opinion, the requirement of tortious conduct was implicit
in the first issue that the court addressed-specifically, whether a negligence or strict liability
standard should govern liability for oil spills on land. The court resolved that issue in favor of
the strict liability standard. 146 N.J. Super. at 171-78, 369 A.2d at 50-54. One reason for the
requirement of tortious conduct is that it avoids deterrence of socially beneficial conduct.
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costs of the services provided by its fire department and granted sum-
mary judgment in favor of the defendants.17
a the subsidy rationale
Cities typically structure the funding for their emergency services in
a way that subsidizes those who use them. For example, fire depart-
ments are usually publicly funded and their services provided for free.
Every person receives as much service as needed with no charge beyond
the property, sales or income tax paid. Those who do not use the service
receive whatever benefit there is in knowing that the service will be avail-
able if needed. Those using the service do not pay the city's full cost for
providing it.
Subsidies are beneficial because each individual's tax payment is
negligible, whereas the actual cost of the service may total thousands of
dollars. Disabling costs are eliminated as the losses are spread among a
large class of taxpayers who suffer comparably little.
Although not explicit in the opinion, the Bridgeton court essentially
adopted a subsidy rationale in denying recovery. The court stated:
Governments, to paraphrase the Declaration of Independence,
have been instituted among men to do for the public good those
things which the people agree are best left to the public sec-
tor.... True, certain activities have developed in areas from
which revenue has been derived, such as turnpikes, water or
power supply, or postal services. Nevertheless, there remains
an area where the people as a whole absorb the cost of such
services-for example, the prevention and detection of
crime.... The services of fire fighters are within this ambit and
may not be billed as a public utility.18
The court never explained why the services of the fire department
were to be absorbed by the people as a whole, stating only that "[c]ost
accounting must have a limiting factor somewhere" 9 because providing
protective services is "the very purpose of government for which it was
created."20
17. 146 N.J. Super. at 179, 369 A.2d at 54-55.
18. Id. at 178, 369 A.2d at 54.
19. The court did not define the term "cost accounting." Id. at 178, 369 A.2d at 55.
Presumably, the term refers to the practice of imposing direct charges on the user of a service.
Thus, the terms "cost accounting" and "user charge" would be synonymous. See supra note 8.
20. 146 N.J. Super. at 179, 369 A.2d at 55. At the time of the decision, both New Jersey
and federal legislation authorized government recovery of abatement costs for cleaning up oil
spills on water. Id. at 178, 369 A.2d at 54. The court noted both the legislation and the
growing "cost accounting" trend where cities charge for their services. Id. Neither the obvi-
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b. hidden disincentives
Although subsidies protect individuals from bearing extreme losses,
they may also lessen incentives to use greater care. For example, in
Bridgeton, the oil spill might have been avoided had the owner and lessee
of the property known that they would be responsible for cleanup costs.
Had it been cheaper for them to repair or replace the tank than to pay
the City to clean up the spill, the defendants presumably would have
done so.
In Bridgeton, the defendants may have had incentives to replace or
maintain their tanks other than avoiding clean up costs. For example, if
the oil that they kept on the property had some value to them, they
would lose that value if the oil spilled. Or, if the oil spilled onto neigh-
boring property, the defendants may have been liable to other property
owners for the damages. Conversely, there may have been no other in-
centives to replace or maintain the tanks. For example, suppose that the
oil was of no or nominal value and that it would have cost the owner and
lessee a considerable amount of money to have it removed. In such a
situation the oil might have been left to stand until the tanks rusted out.
The City would then rush in to clean the spill before damage resulted to
neighboring land.
Regardless of the other incentives which may have existed in
Bridgeton, imposing a user charge on the owner and lessee would have
led to greater care in the future. Even if the oil had value and neighbor-
ing property was threatened by a spill, the additional costs imposed by a
user charge would have increased the incentive to maintain the tanks
properly. By permitting a subsidy to clean up the spill, the court in
Bridgeton lessened that incentive.21
c. the possibility of express contracts
The court in Bridgeton noted that, at oral argument,
ous analogy between land and water nor the recognized cost accounting trend diluted the
court's devotion to the principles inherent in the Declaration of Independence.
A factor that might have played an underlying role in the decision was the court's analogy
to the situation where Bridgeton sought to bill a victim of crime "if a policeman apprehends a
thief." Id. at 179, 369 A.2d at 54. The City sought to charge the "criminal" for the apprehen-
sion, in effect seeking to recover its expenditures from the one who caused danger, not from the
victim of such danger. Thus, the court misstated the analogy. The court's failure to properly
align the parties in its analogy may have distorted the question presented for determination.
An attorney presenting this argument to a court should take care to keep the parties properly
aligned and thus avoid misapplication of the theory.
21. The deterrence section provides additional information on the effects of increased costs
on behavior. See infra text accompanying notes 95-103.
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a fact issue developed as to whether the owner represented that
it would, in fact, be responsible to the city for cleaning up the
spill.... If the facts were to develop that the city's action was
taken only because it was told by the owner that it would be
reimbursed, an action for breach of contract would be
22appropriate.
Not all emergency situations present the opportunity for contractual
negotiations. Yet, even in situations where negotiation is possible, princi-
ples of contract law may prevent the formation of a binding contract.
The Restatement (Second) of Contracts, section 73, states that
"[p]erformance of a legal duty owed to a promisor which is neither
doubtful nor the subject of honest dispute is not consideration.
2 3
The first illustration to section 73 is similar to the situation where a
city seeks to recover costs it already is obliged to expend:
1. A offers a reward to whoever produces evidence lead-
ing to the arrest and conviction of the murderer of B. C pro-
duces such evidence in the performance of his duty as a police
officer. C's performance is not consideration for A's promise.z4
In Bridgeton, the court found that the City had a statutory duty to
provide fire suppression services.25 The nature of that duty would be the
point in issue if section 73 were raised as a defense to an express contract.
The defendant might contend that the City's duty extends not only to the
victims of accidents but to those who cause the accidents as well. To
support the argument, the defendant could argue that the absence of leg-
islation imposing charges on those who cause emergencies reflects the
public policy of subsidizing all those associated with an accident.
In response to that argument, the city in such a case could argue
that it owes a duty to render emergency assistance only to the victims of
accidents and that the public policy of preventing accidents requires that
the defendant bear the cost of emergency services.2z  Alternatively, the
city might argue that those causing emergencies imposed on themselves a
duty to aid their victims and that this duty is paramount to the city's
duty.
27
22. 146 N.J. Super. at 179, 369 A.2d at 55. The City neither alleged a contract nor the
breach thereof. For reasons not stated in the opinion, the court entered judgment without
granting leave to amend. Id. at 180, 369 A.2d at 55.
23. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 73 (1981).
24. Id. § 73, illustration 1.
25. 146 N.J. Super. at 178, 369 A.2d at 54.
26. See infra text accompanying notes 95-104.
27. In Brandon Township v. Jerome Builders, Inc., 80 Mich. App. 180, 263 N.W.2d 326
(1977), Township officials repaired the defendant's dam in fear that it would rupture and the
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2. City of Flagstaff v. Atchison, Topeka & Sante Fe Railway
In City of Flagstaff v. Atchinson, Topeka & Sante Fe Railway,28 the
City evacuated residents who were threatened by leaks and explosions
from four derailed railroad cars carrying liquified petroleum gas. The
City fed the evacuees, paid emergency personnel overtime wages and
purchased emergency medical equipment and personnel. The total cost
to the City of Flagstaff was $41,954.8 1.29
The City sued the railroad for the costs of the evacuation. In an
unpublished opinion, the district court held that Arizona law did not
recognize the City as a proper plaintif,30 and that specific authorization
for the recovery sought must come from the Arizona legislature rather
than from the courts. Summary judgment was granted for the defendant
and the order was affirmed on appeal. 3
1
The Ninth Circuit relied on two grounds in affirming the district
court opinion.32 First, the court reasoned that settled expectations would
be disturbed by allowing the City to recover.33 Second, the court consid-
ered the matter to befiscal and therefore reserved to the Arizona State
Legislature.
34
a. disturbing settled expectations
The court upheld the general rule that settled expectations should
not be disturbed.35 However, the Ninth Circuit also noted that
[s]ettled expectations sometimes must be disregarded where
new tort doctrines are required to cure an unjust allocation of
risks and costs. The argument for the imposition of the new
liability is not so compelling, however, where a fair and sensible
system for spreading the costs of an accident is already in place,
even if the alternate scheme proposed might be a more precise
waters contained would devastate the township. Id. at 182, 263 N.W.2d at 327. Implicit in
the court's finding of liability was that the defendant's duty to repair the dam transcended the
duty of the Township to do so. Id. at 183, 263 N.W.2d at 328.
28. 719 F.2d 322 (9th Cir. 1983).
29. Id. at 323.
30. Id. The court was sitting in a diversity case, requiring the application of state law
where the issue was one of first impression. The City sued on the theory that when someone's
negligent or ultrahazardous activity causes the use of government services, that person is re-
sponsible for compensating the government for abatement costs. Id. The decision does not
state whether it made a finding of liability.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 323-24.
33. Id. at 323.
34. Id. at 324.
35. Id. at 323.
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one. Here the city spreads the expense of emergency services to
its taxpayers, an allocation which is neither irrational nor
unfair.
3 6
Even assuming that it is fair and sensible to spread evacuation costs
among taxpayers, the court ignored an important element of the risk al-
location formula. The wisdom of a legal rule also depends on the rule's
effect on human behavior. Ideally, the costs of an accident should be
borne by the party best able to avoid future accidents. In Flagstaff, the
railroad used the tracks and operated the train that derailed. Presuma-
bly, it was in a better position than the City to monitor and control the
probability of a derailment. The City could only respond to the derail-
ment after it occurred. Although settled expectations may promote cer-
tainty in personal and business decisions, they may also nurture careless
conduct.37 Especially in a case like Flagstaff, where the evacuation costs
could have been allocated through the railroad's prices or insurance, the
additional deterrent value of a new rule should disturb settled
expectations.3 8
b. the legislative prerogative
In Flagstaff, the Ninth Circuit also established a legislative preroga-
tive over the realm of decisions implicating fiscal policy.
Here governmental entities themselves currently bear the cost
in question, and they have taken no action to shift it elsewhere.
If the government has chosen to bear the cost for reasons of
economic efficiency, or even as a subsidy to the citizens and
their business, the decision implicates fiscal policy; the legisla-
ture and its public deliberative processes, rather than the court,
is the appropriate forum to address such fiscal concerns.3 9
Two important observations are contained in the language quoted
above. First, it assumes that legislative inaction represents a negative
intent. Second, the court held that decisions implicating fiscal policy are
to be determined by the Arizona legislature.'
36. Id.
37. See infra text accompanying notes 103-04.
38. The ability to spread costs might impair the deterrent effect of a user charge. How-
ever, the railroad cannot spread these costs at will. First, it is restrained by the prices that
passengers and carriers are willing to pay before turning to alternative modes of transporta-
tion. Second, insurance companies will not insure bad risks, or will only insure them on strict
terms and for higher prices.
39. 719 F.2d at 324.
40. Id. To establish the legislative prerogative, the Ninth Circuit relied on United States v.
Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301 (1947), a United States Supreme Court case deciding an issue
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Legislative inaction may support many suppositions. For example,
the legislature may have assumed that this issue would be resolved by the
courts since the courts often make decisions allocating risks and costs.41
Alternatively, the legislature may not have been aware of the problem42
or, if aware of the problem, individual legislators may have been unable
to agree on the wording of a bill in committee thereby defeating a posi-
tion with which all agreed.
Admittedly, the legislature is the branch of government responsible
for making fiscal decisions. It is better equipped than the judiciary to
balance the competing interests of a diverse citizenry. Yet, simply be-
cause a decision "implicates" fiscal policy, it does not follow that the
decision is swallowed by it. Imposing evacuation costs on a railroad can
be viewed as a deterrent measure or as a means of implementing tradi-
tional concepts of fairness. Courts have traditionally made rules to effec-
of federal law. In Standard Oil, a negligent truck driver injured a soldier in the United States
Army. The United States brought suit against the truck driver to recover medical expenses
and his pay during the time of disability. The Supreme Court denied recovery on the ground
that Congress "is the primary and most often the exclusive arbiter offederal fiscal affairs." Id.
at 314 (emphasis added). Why the court in Flagstaff felt itself bound by the decision in Stan-
dard Oil is not readily discernible. Flagstaff involved a suit by a city government against a
private corporation on a claim based on state law. 719 F.2d at 323. Federal separation of
powers was not an issue.
41. This is particularly true in the tort area. A good example of risk and cost allocation
can be found in the California duty analysis in negligence cases. In California, all individuals
are required to use reasonable care to avoid injury to others:
A departure from this fundamental principle involves the balancing of a number
of considerations; the major ones are the foreseeabilty of harm to the plaintiff, the
degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury, the closeness of the connection
between the defendant's conduct and the injury suffered, the moral blame attached to
the defendant's conduct, the policy of preventing future harm, the extent of the bur-
den to the defendant and consequences to the community of imposing a duty to
exercise care with resulting liability for breach, and the availability, cost, and preva-
lence of insurance for the risk involved.
Rowland v. Christian, 60 Cal. 2d 108, 112-13, 443 P.2d 561, 564, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97, 100 (1968)
(citations omitted) (abrogating common law duty limitation of occupiers of land to social
guests).
Thus, in every case where the defendant disputes the existence of a duty, the courts must
engage in a new balancing of risks and costs.
42. In United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301 (1947), the Court noted that the
Army had long been aware of the expenditures on medical care for soldiers injured by
tortfeasors. Id. at 315. See supra note 40. It stated:
"[tU]pwards of 450 instances of negligently inflicted injuries upon soldiers of the
United States, requiring hospitalization at Government expense,... have been re-
ported by the War Department to the Department of Justice in the past three years,"
and ... additional instances [are] being reported to the War Department at the rate
of approximately 40 a month.
Id. at 302-03 n.2 (quoting Government's petition for certiorari). Where it is clear that the
problem is known, there is a stronger inference that inaction means legislative consent.
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tuate these concerns.43
The Ninth Circuit's abdication of its decision-making power to the
legislature may have been influenced by two factors. First, the court may
have felt itself limited by the legal position in which it found itself-
specifically, sitting in a diversity case based on state law where the case
was one of first impression.' Second, the court may have wished to
avoid an economic analysis that it acknowledged was difficult to apply.
45
Faced with the task of deciding whether the City or the railroad was the
best cost avoider,46 the Ninth Circuit invoked the legislative prerogative
over fiscal matters, thus dodging the issue.
3. Brandon Township v. Jerome Builders
In Brandon Township v. Jerome Builders,47 fear that the defendant's
dam might rupture prompted Brandon, Michigan town officials to repair
43. See, eg., supra note 41. Two of the factors in the Rowland duty analysis are "the
moral blame attached to the defendant's conduct, [and] the policy of preventing future harm."
60 Cal. 2d at 113, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 100, 443 P.2d at 564. Thus, as a routine matter in negli-
gence cases, California courts can implement deterrent measures and traditional concepts of
fairness.
44. 719 F.2d at 323. At the time of the decision, there was no procedure by which the
Ninth Circuit could certify questions to the Arizona Supreme Court. Moreover, the appellants
did not request a stay of proceedings pending a declaratory action in the Arizona courts. Id. at
324.
45. The Ninth Circuit acknowledged "the practical difficulties of the approach." 719 F.2d
at 323.
46. Id. at 323-24. The court cited Union Oil Co. v. Oppen, 501 F.2d 558 (9th Cir. 1974),
in which the court recognized an injury to commercial fishermen's economic expectancy in
marine life resulting from the Santa Barbara oil spills. The court found the economic expec-
tancy compensable using a market analysis of the efficient liability rule. Id. at 569. Judge
Sneed wrote:
Recently a number of scholars have suggested that liability for losses occasioned by
torts should be apportioned in a manner that will best contribute to the achievement
of an optimum allocation of resources .... This optimum, in theory would be that
which would be achieved by a perfect market system. In determining whether the
cost of an accident should be borne by the injured party or be shifted, in whole or in
part, this approach requires the court to fix the identity of the party who can avoid
the costs more cheaply. Once fixed, this determination then controls liability.
Id. (citations omitted).
Judge Sneed then proceeded to apply Professor Guido Calabresi's guidelines for locating
the best cost avoider. The Judge determined that the oil companies responsible for the spill
could best avoid the costs. Id. at 569-70 (citing G. CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS
(1970)). For an analysis of Judge Sneed's reasoning, see Posner, Some Uses and Abuses of
Economics in Law, 46 U. CHI. L. REv. 281, 297-301 (1979).
In Flagstaff, the Ninth Circuit recognized "the force of the suggestion that risks should be
imposed on the party who can avoid them most economically or pass the costs on most effi-
ciently." 719 F.2d at 323. Yet, the court avoided determining which party was in the best
position to do so. Id. at 324.
47. 80 Mich. App. 180, 263 N.W.2d 326 (1977).
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the dam. The total cost of repairs to the Township was $19,230.96, part
of which was paid for by the state disaster fund. The Township brought
suit for the balance of $15,431.96, pleading theories of nuisance and un-
just enrichment. The trial court entered summary judgment against the
Township for failing to state a claim upon which relief could be
granted."8
On appeal, the order for summary judgment was reversed and the
case remanded with instructions in effect recognizing that user charges
could be imposed on the defendant. 9 Summary judgment had been en-
tered on the nuisance cause of action because of a defect in the prayer."0
The Township sought a recovery in the form of damages,51 while a state
statute provided that such costs "'shall be collected and treated in the
same manner as are taxes assessed [against property] under the general
laws of the state.' ,52 The Township was granted leave to amend its
prayer
5 3
Summary judgment was also reversed on the unjust enrichment
cause of action. 4 Citing section 115 of the Restatement of Restitution,
the court summarily concluded that the "[d]efendants were enriched...
and the enrichment was unjust because it was defendants' duty to repair
the dam."5
Section 115 states:
A person who has performed the duty of another by sup-
plying things or services, although acting without the other's
knowledge or consent is entitled to restitution from the other if
(a) he acted unofficiously and with intent to charge
therefore, and
(b) the things or services supplied were immediately nec-
essary to satisfy the requirements of public decency,
health, or safety.
56
Because the court found that the defendant had a duty to repair the
48. Id. at 181-82, 263 N.W.2d at 327.
49. Id. at 184, 263 N.W.2d at 328.
50. Id. at 183-84, 263 N.W.2d at 328.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 184, 263 N.W.2d at 328 (quoting MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 327.10 (1970)).
53. Id.
54. Id. at 183, 263 N.W.2d at 328.
55. Id. (emphasis added) (citing REsTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 115 (1937)).
56. RESTATEMENT OF RSTUTION § 115 (1937); see also id. §§ 112 (No restitution un-
less benefit conferred when necessary for protection of beneficiary or third party), 113 ("Per-
formance of Another's Noncontractual Duty to Supply Necessaries to a Third Person"), 114
("Performance of Another's Duty to a Third Person in an Emergency"), 116 (Restitution
permitted where things or services provided for preservation of health or life of beneficiary).
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dam,57 the next question to be decided was whether the Township acted
unofficiously and with an intent to charge for the service. The "officious-
ness" requirement may be avoided when (1) the defendant is informed of
the hazard and refuses to act or (2) when time limitations preclude con-
sultation. 8 In Brandon, the defendants had been warned repeatedly of
the danger. Indeed, the threat of the dam rupturing was imminent when
the Township conducted the repairs. Yet, the defendants refused to
act. 9 "Intent to charge" requires that the person rendering aid not act
solely out of humane motives.' Although altruism may have comprised
part of the motivation in Brandon, there also may have been a concern
for the resulting financial costs had the dam burst.
The last requirement of section 115 requires that the materials or
services supplied are "immediately necessary" to ensure public health or
safety.6 1 That requirement also seems to have been met in Brandon:
Plaintiff advised defendants on numerous occasions that the
dam was in need of repair, and that it feared a catastrophic
57. 80 Mich. App. at 183, 263 N.W.2d at 328.
58. RESTATEMENT OF RE TTUiON § 115(a) (1937). Comment c of § 115 incorporates
comment b of § 114 by reference. Id. § 115 comment c. Comment b of § 114 notes that
recovery is limited to the value of "necessary" relief. Id. § 114 comment b. Comment b fur-
ther states that-
any person who has the things or who is qualified to render the services which are
required can perform the duty and obtain restitution therefor, provided that there is
no reasonable opportunity to communicate with those who because of natural ties or
official position or otherwise would ordinarily perform the services ....
Id.
Comment b might be construed to deny recovery to government entities because of their
official duty to provide such services. However, the next sentence of comment b provides an
example that negates such an interpretation. "[A]ny qualified physician rendering aid to a
child... is entitled to compensation from the absent parent... unless the family physician
was available ..... " Id. Comment b would allow the family physician restitution if placed in
the same position as the rescuing physician. Consistency requires that Brandon Township, like
the family physician, should be able to recover.
The court in Brandon did not address the officiousness element of § 115. However, any
objection to the Towuship's status as a government would have appeared frivolous under the
facts of the case. In Brandon, a state statute permitted government recovery for the costs of
abating a nuisance. 80 Mich. App. at 184, 263 N.W.2d at 328.
59. 80 Mich. App. at 182, 263 N.W.2d at 327.
60. RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 115(a) (1937). Comment c of § 115 incorporates
comment c of § 114 by reference. Id. § 115 comment c. The intent to charge requirement is
an anomaly given § 115's factual context. Only when immediate necessity exists may restitu-
tion be provided under § 115. In emergencies, an intent to charge for services may be the
furthest thing from the human mind. In retrospect, however, a person might be very disgrun-
tled to learn that "a person who acts entirely from motives of humanity is not entitled to
restitution." RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 114 comment c (1937). The intent to charge
requirement may have an adverse effect on the giving of aid. The court in Brandon did not
address this aspect of § 115.
61. RESTATEMENT OF RESTTUTION § 115(b) (1937).
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rupture and flood in the event of heavy rainfull.... Because of
the heavy spring rainfall and runoff plaintiff determined that
there was an imminent threat to the health, safety and welfare
of the township residents, and therefore repaired the dam and
made it safe.62
Flagstaff and Bridgeton differ very little from Brandon. Both of
those cases can meet the requirement of section 115, which illustrates the
flexibility of the restitutionary remedy. In Flagstaff, the City evacuated
residents threatened by leaks and explosions from four derailed railroad
cars containing liquifled petroleum gas.6 3 Since the railroad had imper-
iled the residents, it had a duty to assist them.' The City performed this
duty on behalf of the railroad. The services were rendered unofficiously
in that time limits precluded consultation." The City intended to charge
because the value of the services was not de minimus, and its motivation
was not entirely altruistic. 6
In Bridgeton,67 the landowner had a duty to safely maintain the
tanks on its land.68 The City, in essence, performed the duty by cleaning
up the spill. Apparently, the City had an oral contract with the land-
owner to clean the spill which satisfies both the unofficiousness and in-
tent to charge requirements of section 115.69 The oral agreement
admitted that the materials and services supplied were necessary to sat-
isfy the needs of public decency. The agreement also implied the exist-
ence of a large oil spill.
B. Nuisance Law
This section addresses two aspects of nuisance law that may raise
obstacles to the recovery of user charges for emergency service expendi-
tures. First, the issue of whether a single event constitutes a nuisance
often arises when trying to establish a nuisance cause of action. Second,
62. 80 Mich. App. at 182, 263 N.W.2d at 327.
63. 719 F.2d 322.
64. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 321(1) (1965) provides in pertinent part: "If
the actor does an act, and subsequently realizes or should realize that it has created an unrea-
sonable risk of causing physical harm to another, he is under a duty to exercise reasonable care
to prevent the risk from taking effect."
65. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
66. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
67. 146 N.J. Super. 169, 369 A.2d 49.
68. In fact, the court in Bridgeton had concluded earlier in the opinion that one who stores
pollutants on land in New Jersey is strictly liable for damages caused by such substances to
adjoining land. Id. at 177, 369 A.2d at 53-54.
69. Id. at 179-80, 369 A.2d at 55. See supra notes 58 & 60 and accompanying text.
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the method of assessing damages is a problem that may arise when estab-
lishing the means of recovery.
1. Single events as nuisances
Regarding the law of nuisance, Professor William Prosser wrote
"[t]here is perhaps no more impenetrable jungle in the entire law than
that which surrounds the word 'nuisance.' It has meant all things to all
men, and has been applied indiscriminately to everything from an alarm-
ig advertisement to a cockroach baked in a pie."70
Nuisance law encompasses a wide variety of conduct and protects a
similarly wide range of interests.71 However, regardless of whether the
nuisance is public72 or private,73 nuisance liability only exists "to those to
whom it causes significant harm."74
Seemingly, if someone's conduct creates an emergency and signifi-
cant harm results, a cause of action under a nuisance theory would be
successful. However, two aspects of a typical emergency seem antitheti-
cal to recovery under a nuisance theory. The typical emergency is a one-
time event of limited duration. In contrast, two common characteristics
of nuisances are their recurrence and continuity.75
Some courts have denied recovery to plaintiffs alleging that a single
injurious event constituted a nuisance. For instance, in Nussbaum v.
Lacopo,76 the plaintiff was denied recovery on a nuisance theory when he
was struck by a golf ball from a neighboring golf course while on his
patio. Yet, for other courts, the duration or frequency of an activity
presents no obstacle to recovery under a nuisance theory. For example, a
70. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 571 (4th ed. 1971) (footnotes
omitted).
71. Id. at 571-72. See, eg., infra text accompanying notes 76-78.
72. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B (1979) provides:
(1) A public nuisance is an unreasonable interference with a right common to the
general public.
(2) Circumstances that may sustain a holding that an interference with a public
right is unreasonable include the following:
(a) Whether the conduct involves a significant interference with the public
health, the public safety, the public peace, the public comfort or the public conven-
ience, or
(b) whether the conduct is proscribed by a statute, ordinance or administrative
regulation, or
(c) whether the conduct is of a continuing nature or has produced a permanent
or long-lasting effect, and, as the actor knows or has reason to know, has a significant
effect upon the public right.
73. "A private nuisance is a nontrespassory invasion of another's interest in the private use
and enjoyment of land." Id. § 821D.
74. Id. § 821F.
75. See F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS § 1.23 at 67 (1956).
76. 27 N.Y.2d 311, 317 N.Y.S.2d 347, 265 N.E.2d 762 (1970).
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single instance of indecent exposure was held to be a public nuisance in
Truet v. State.77 And, in E. Rauh & Sons Fertilizer Co. v. Shreffler,7s the
plaintiff recovered damages to its crops on a nuisance theory when gasses
generated by the defendant's fertilizer plant escaped due to a single
breakdown of the plant's safety apparatus.
Generally, the decisions denying recovery in nuisance for a single or
limited act may be explained on other grounds.7 9 For example, con-
tinuity or recurrence may be necessary as a ground for injunctive relief.80
Furthermore, as noted above, a showing of significant harm is necessary
to establish a nuisance, and such harm may require a showing of repeti-
tion or duration."1 Thus, so long as the activity creating an emergency
satisfies the elements of a nuisance cause of action, 2 the brief or solitary
nature of the activity should not be an issue.
However, the limited nature of an emergency may create a concep-
tual barrier that a defendant may attempt to exploit. A plaintiff alleging
that a single accident constituted a nuisance should emphasize the signifi-
cance of the harm caused by the defendant's conduct. There is no estab-
lished rule that the duration or frequency of an activity exclusively
determines whether or not it is a nuisance.8 3
2. Recovery of abatement costs
Although a nuisance action may entitle the government to the re-
covery of user charges, state legislation may limit the means of recovery.
For example, in Brandon Township v. Jerome Builders, Inc.,84 the Town-
ship sought to recover costs it incurred in repairing the defendants' dam.
Summary judgment was granted against the Township because a state
statute permitted the recovery of abatement costs only in the form of
property tax assessments. On appeal, Brandon was granted leave to
amend its prayer.
85
In addition to limiting the means of recovery, state legislation like
77. 3 Ala. App. 114, 57 So. 512 (1912).
78. 139 F.2d 38 (6th Cir. 1943).
79. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821F comment g (1979); W. PROSSER,
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 579-80 (4th ed. 1971). For a compilation of cases on the
subject, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS app. § 821F comment g (1982).
80. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821F comment g (1979).
81. Id.
82. See supra notes 72-73.
83. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821F comment g (1979); W. PROSSER,
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 579-60 (4th ed. 1971). For a compilation of cases on the
subject, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS app. § 821F comment g at 505-06 (1982).
84. 80 Mich. App. 180, 263 N.W.2d 326; see supra notes 47-62 and accompanying text.
85. Id. at 184, 263 N.W.2d at 328.
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that involved in Brandon may defeat recovery entirely if a nuisance is not
land related. If, for instance, a nuisance is created by the operation of a
vehicle, the government cannot assess the abatement costs against real
property.
C. Summary
Only three cases have been reported in which a government entity
sought to recover excessive service expenditures from the tortfeasor re-
sponsible for the underlying emergency. 86 In two instances, the defend-
ants prevailed. 7 Three arguments have succeeded in defeating recovery:
(1) the subsidy rationale,88 (2) the settled expectations doctrine8 9 and
(3) the legislative prerogative.90 Additionally, a hidden danger lurked in
the City of Bridgeton's assertion that the defendant promised to reim-
burse the City for abatement expenditures. 91
The one case in which the government successfully recovered its
costs92 is instructive for future attempts at recovery. In Brandon, the
Township survived summary judgment motions on both quasi-contract
9 3
and nuisance94 theories.
III. DETERRENCE
A basic theorem of economics is that increasing the price of an ac-
tivity will result in a shift away from that activity, although the magni-
tude of the shift may be unknown.9" For example, if the price of lift
tickets at Mt. Sheerface rises from $25.00 to $50.00, skiers may decide to
quit skiing entirely, to ski less, to ski elsewhere or select a different sport.
If the price of the tickets rose to $100, the magnitude of the shift away
from skiing at Mt. Sheerface would be even greater.
User charges represent an increase in the price of engaging in an
86. City of Flagstaff v. Atchinson, T. & S.F. Ry., 719 F.2d 322 (9th Cir. 1983); City of
Bridgeton v. B. P. Oil, Inc., 146 N.J. Super. 169, 369 A.2d 49 (1976); Brandon Township v.
Jerome Builders, Inc., 80 Mich. App. 180, 263 N.W.2d 326 (1977).
87. City of Flagstaff v. Atchinson, T. & S.F. Ry., 719 F.2d 322 (9th Cir. 1983); City of
Bridgeton v. B. P. Oil, Inc., 146 N.J. Super. 169, 369 A.2d 49 (1976).
88. See supra text accompanying notes 17-20.
89. See supra text accompanying notes 35-38.
90. See supra text accompanying notes 39-46.
91. See supra text accompanying notes 22-27.
92. Brandon Township v. Jerome Builders, Inc., 80 Mich. App. 180, 263 N.W.2d 326
(1977).
93. See supra text accompanying notes 54-62.
94. See supra text accompanying notes 49-53.
95. Ehrlich, The Deterrent Effect of Criminal Law Enforcement, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 259,
261 (1972).
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activity carelessly, or in engaging in an activity at all.96 Consequently,
the imposition of user charges should be followed by either a reduction of
dangerous activities or by an increase in carefulness when engaging in
activities that might cause emergencies.97 Moreover, a reduction in
emergencies would reduce the need for emergency services. If there were
less need for such services, public revenue could be directed back to the
taxpayers, either through a tax reduction or through the provisions of
other goods and services. Additional savings would result from the de-
crease in injuries, property damage and litigation.98
The materials that follow are largely derived from law and econom-
ics literature. In part A, below, an economic model of deterrence is set
out as a framework for the discussion in parts B and C. Part B illustrates
how the model constructed in part A would operate on rock climbers if
they were billed for rescue services. Finally, part C discusses the deter-
rence environment of City of Flagstaff v. Atchinson, Topeka & Sante Fe
Railway.
A. Expected Values and Harm Reduction
People cannot see into the future and know the outcome of an act.
They can only estimate probabilities. By multiplying the probability of
an outcome (the chances of its occurrence or nonoccurrence) by its value
(whether negative or positive), a weighted value for that outcome may be
established. By totaling the weighted values, an expected value for the
act (or for acting with a given level of care) is derived. If the expected
value is positive, a person will perform the contemplated act.99 In order
to deter the act, the expected costs associated with the act must be in-
creased. This may be accomplished either by increasing the probability
that a penalty will be enforced, by increasing the value of the penalty or
by increasing both.
B. Rock Climbers and User Charges
An application of the framework outlined above displays how the
96. The impositions of user charges is an increase in that price because emergency services
are presently funded by general tax revenues.
97. Of course, when the cost of care is greater than the cost of an accident (tort liability
plus user charges), a rational profit maximizing enterprise (or individual) will opt to cause the
accident. Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 29, 33 (1972).
98. However, at least one qualification is necessary. A user charge should only be imposed
when the behavior involved is the type of behavior society wishes to deter. Otherwise, benefi-
cial conduct will be deterred.
99. See generally C. GOETz, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LAW AND ECONOMICS 75-82
(1982); Erlich, supra note 95, at 261-65.
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imposition of user charges will increase the amount of care that a hypo-
thetical rock climber uses to scale Mt. Sheerface. Due to the danger
involved, only ten climbers have attempted to scale the mountain. Four
succeeded, three descended the face on their own after failing to scale the
mountain, one fell and was crippled, and two fell and were killed.
Climber 11 is now considering an assault on the face.
There are four possible outcomes from the climb: success, falling,
self-help and rescue. By exercising various levels of care, Climber 11
lessens the hazard of death or serious injury by a certain percentage.
Each additional unit of care has four further effects: (1) it increases the
cost of the climb; (2) it increases the probability that the climb will be
successful; (3) it increases the probability that Climber 11 can get off Mt.
Sheerface on her own if the climb is not successful; and, (4) it decreases
the probability that rescue will be needed. However, the effect of each
additional unit of care on the various probabilities is less than the effect
of the preceding unit."°
Before settling on a level of care, Climber 11 is faced with two deci-
sions. First, she must decide whether or not the expected value of the
climb is positive. Mathematically, this requirement is expressed as fol-
lows: (p1 * B) - [(p2 * cl) + (p3 * c2) + (p4 * c3) + C] 0
The four outcomes (success, fall, self-help and rescue) are repre-
sented by the symbols pl, p2, p3 and p4, respectively. B is the benefit
derived from success; cl, c2 and c3 are the costs associated with the
probabilities of falling, having to get down alone and being rescued. C is
the cost of using a particular level of care.
Second, Climber 11 must also decide the level of care she uses that is
the most profitable. Among her care options, Climber 11 will choose the
one which promises the greatest return. Table 1 presents a set of hypo-
thetical probabilities that might correspond to her assessments. 10 1
100. The associated increases and decreases are assumed to have the quality of diminishing
marginal returns. As more and more care is employed, further care has less of an effect on the
various probabilities. See C. GoETz, supra note 99 at 104-07.
101. Note that the probabilities in Table 1 assume diminishing marginal returns from every
$500 expenditure on care. See C. GoETz, supra note 99, at 104-07.
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Table 1 (Hypothetical Probabilities)
T C pl p2  p3 p4 P
T1 $1500 .50 .16 .11 .23 1.00
T2 2000 .54 .13 .14 .19 1.00
T3 2500 .56 .11 .17 .16 1.00
T4 3000 .57 .10 .19 .14 1.00
The symbols in the table represent the same probabilities outlined in
the equation above. For example, in the first row of Table 1, the
probability that the climb will be successful is fifty percent, that Climber
11 will fall is sixteen percent, that she will be stranded and get down on
her own is eleven percent and that she will need to be rescued is twenty-
three percent.
The values for Climber 1l's benefit and various costs are arbitrar-
ily10 2 set so that B = $10,000; cl = $10,000; c2 = $200; and c3 equals
either $200 or $5000. The different values for c3 represent the $200 cost
of being stranded but rescued for free, and the contrived $5000 cost to
Climber 11 if she is made to pay the price for emergency services. Table
2 presents Climber I l's expected value assessments for the various levels
of care (T) that she is considering (TI, T2, T3 and T4) absent user
charges. Table 2 is derived from the level of care equation outlined
above.
Table 2 (Care Level Without User Charges)
T = (pl B) - [(p2 , cl) + (p3 * c2) + (p4, c3) + C] = X
T1 $5000 $1600 $22.00 $46.00 $1500 $1786
T2 5400 1300 28.00 38.00 2000 1996
T3 5600 1100 34.00 32.00 2500 1902
T4 5700 1000 38.00 28.00 3000 1608
If Climber 11 is not charged for the cost of a rescue, she will choose
care level T2, where her net expected gain from the climb is $1996. At
102. A central problem with deterrence is that we do not know what punishments will deter
which people. Individual value assessments vary throughout the spectrum of possible human
and environmental characteristics. Factors including age, sex, race, wealth, education, em-
ployment, personality and peer influences are among those that make one person's deterrent
another's incentive. See generally C. TITTLE, SANCTIONS AND SOCIAL DEVIANCE: THE
QUESTION OF DETERRENCE (1980).
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T2, she derives the most possible benefit from the climb. Note that fur-
ther levels of care would increase the safety of her climb, but the in-
creases in safety would cost her more than they are worth.
Table 3 represents Climber 1 l's same value assessments when user
charges are imposed for the use of a rescue service.
Table 3 (Care Level With User Charges)
T = (p1 0 B) - [(p2 * cl) + (p3 *e 2) + (p4. c3) + C] = X
TI $5000 $1600 $22.00 $1150 $1500 $ 723
T2 5400 1300 28.00 950 2000 1122
T3 5600 1100 34.00 800 2500 1166
T4 5700 1000 38.00 700 3000 962
If Climber 11 must pay the price for the rescue (Y), she will select
care level T3, where her benefit is $1166. This represents an increase in
care from the situation where user charges were not imposed.
The rock climber hypothetical illustrates that the imposition of user
charges on the one causing the need for emergency service may either
deter a climb (when 0 > T) or may influence a climber to use additional
care. This is particularly true when the climber actually considers rescue
to be a benefit, in which case even less care may be exercised.
By compelling Climber 11 to pay the cost of rescue operations, we
may be able to reduce both the probability of death or serious injury and
the probability that rescue operations will be necessary. Additional gains
possibly include an increase in the number of successful climbs, and a
greater incidence of self-help by stranded climbers.
C. A Note on the Deterrence Environment in Flagstaff
In the last example, Climber 11 posed danger only to herself. In the
case of emergencies, danger will often be imposed on others. If a victim
is injured or property is damaged, and the conduct is tortious, the person
causing the accident will also pay damages.
Potential liability to others increases the expected costs of an activ-
ity. In the rock climber example, Climber 11 wanted to avoid a fall and
thus took enough care to protect herself. When tort liability exists, a
person will exercise self-precautions and will use additional care to pro-
tect others.
Occasionally, the potential liability to others may be very great,
either because the probability of injury is high or because injuries will be
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extensive if an accident occurs. In such situations, the threat of an addi-
tional expected cost, that of a user charge, may seem slight by compari-
son. The primary deterrent will be the liability for personal injury rather
than the payment of user charges. The question then becomes one of
marginal effects.
An example of the situation just described existed in City of Flag-
staff v. Atchinson, Topeka & Sante Fe Railway,1"3 where four railroad
cars carrying liquified petroleum gas derailed within the City limits.
Fearing leaks and explosions, Flagstaff City officials evacuated and fed
nearby residents, paid emergency personnel overtime wages, and paid for
emergency medical equipment and personnel. The total cost to the City
of the expenditure was more than $40,000.10 Would the imposition of
abatement costs cause the railroad to take greater measures of care to
prevent future accidents than the railroad took when it merely expected
liability to Flagstaff residents?
Assuming that the railroad took sufficient care to reduce the
probability of derailment to twenty percent, and that abatement costs at
that level of care were expected to average $40,000, the railroad's ex-
pected cost would have been $8000. If another unit of care cost more
than $8000 and would not significantly affect the probability of derail-
ment, the railroad would not use additional care, opting instead to accept
the additional expected loss.
Where the potential for high liability exists, a person may exercise
the levels of care necessary to reduce the probability of injury to a very
low level. Reducing the probability below that level requires increasingly
large safety expenditures. In Flagstaff, the railroad might well have cho-
sen to assume an expected cost of $8000 rather than to take any addi-
tional care. A conclusion that the railroad would use more care in the
future would be warranted where the railroad could significantly affect
the probability of derailment, and where the cost of doing so would be
less than the expected cost of the services provided. The only certainty,
however, is that the railroad will not take additional care if immune from
charges for government services.
IV. CONCLUSION-A PROPOSED CAUSE OF ACTION
This Comment has been directed at practicing lawyers. Ordinances
or statutes might be written which would impose user charges on those
using emergency services. However, in the absence of such legislation,
103. 719 F.2d 322 (9th Cir. 1983). See supra text accompanying notes 28-46.
104. 719 F.2d at 323.
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lawyers must turn to the common law for the theory to recover user
charges.
Nuisance and restitution actions may provide some protection for
cities forced to subsidize emergencies created by particular individuals or
businesses. However, the best approach for recovery of emergency ser-
vice expenditures would be to establish a cause of action similar to the
one suggested by the City of Bridgeton.
The cause of action would require that negligent conduct created
the emergency and that there was excessive use of the government ser-
vice. Excessive use would include not only the cost of one large emer-
gency, but also the cost of responding to numerous emergencies.
The damage formula would consist of three parts. First, the expense
claimed must be incurred in abating the emergency. Second, the expense
must be the proximate result of the defendant's wrongful conduct. And,
third, the expense must be reasonably incurred.105 The elements of dam-
ages would include the cost of labor and expenses incured to abate the
emergency.
Requiring negligent conduct prevents deterrence of innocent or ben-
eficial conduct. Requiring excessive use serves two purposes. First, it
permits some subsidy or cost spreading. Second, it eliminates the gov-
ernment's costs of litigation by limiting the right of action.
Erich Rolf Luschei
105. This is the damage formula adopted in People v. Southern Cal. Edison Co., 56 Cal.
App. 3d 593, 605, 128 Cal. Rptr. 697, 705 (1976), in construing the California fire liability law.
See supra note 8.
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